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FAITH IN THE RISEN CHRIST

RALPH EASTWELL, S.J.

FAITH is a rational act because the assent has already been seen (in the judgement of prudent credibility) to be firmly grounded in evidence; it is a free act because the assent is not compelled either by the evidence for prudent credibility or by the divine invitation which results in the "I ought to believe" of the judgement of theological credibility; it is a supernatural act because it can only be made by means of the light of faith offered in the divine invitation and because we believe on account of the authority of God our Saviour who reveals both his authority and his identity in the invitation to believe. But unless we *want* to believe we shall not put aside prejudice and the disinclination to accept a conclusion which will mean a radical change of life; all through the process there must be the good-will to believe (*affectus credulitatis*). The good-will to believe, elevated by the infused virtue and prompted by actual graces, also enables the Catholic to extend his act of faith explicitly to whatever the Church defines. The part played by the will in this extension of faith to new objects of belief finds some interesting illustrations in the Gospel accounts of the Resurrection.

The friends of our Lord already had the infused virtue; as devout Jews they already believed in God as the Saviour of his people; as faithful followers of Christ they believed in him as the Messiah and more than a mere man. Yet on the first Holy Saturday they seem completely to have forgotten his forecasts of the Resurrection, and on Easter Sunday they each needed special illuminations to bring them to full faith. Their good-will to believe was there but it was stunted in its operation. Christ had told them several times how he was to achieve his glory; but they had not taken it in: it was too unlike the traditional idea of the worldly victory of the Messiah and the notion of Yahweh as the all-conquering King of Israel, striking his enemies dead but himself reigning ever victorious. The Passion had numbed their minds and wills: they had been expecting something so different—something to which Palm Sunday must have seemed the prelude. "We *had* hoped that it was he who was to redeem Israel . . . but now . . .". Our Lord's painstaking and loving efforts to bring them to the full use of their gifts took different courses. He who had made each individual respected their natures and knew that each needed individual treatment.

The Gospels tell us nothing of our Lady's reactions. As St. Ignatius tells us, we have to use our understanding based on what the scriptures do relate of her. Her *fiat* had been a complete handing-over of herself to God to be his Mother and for all that that might mean. Not only was she completely free from the popular material notions of the Kingdom but she would have realised, at least dimly at the beginning, that his triumph would be in some way realised through suffering. That she herself would share in this suffering she knew from the prophecy of Simeon and she had experienced a foretaste of this when she lost her Son for three days in Jerusalem and from her loneliness when he left

home for his public life. But at Cana, in warning her of the coming separation, he had also hinted at a new role and a new extension of her Motherhood when his hour had come (1).

All these things and others we know nothing of she kept in her heart, always renewing her utter self-offering. On Calvary probably she alone had realised the significance of his *consummatum est* and known that his hour had come. That he was God she had known for many years: death could not mean an end of his life. She must also have remembered his predictions of the Passion and Resurrection. So, on Holy Saturday, her grief, although the deepest of all because proportioned to her love for him, would at the same time have been mingled with the certain hope of the glorious event of Easter morning. Her risen Son's visit to her, therefore, was not to bring her faith, but to reward her faithfulness and confirm her in her new Motherhood.

The holy women, having spent the Sabbath at home according to the Law, came at the first light of Sunday to complete the hurried burial rites of their Lord. They found the tomb empty and guarded by angels and received the glad tidings of the Resurrection. Apparently they believed at once and hurried away to tell the apostles.

Magdalen did not see the angels on her first visit, but leaped to the conclusion that the tomb had been rifled and sped back to the city to tell the menfolk. When she did see the angel he seems to have directed her attention to the figure at the door. But she did not recognise him until he spoke her name. On the face of it, one would have expected Magdalen, who obviously had a deep love for our Lord, to have had deeper powers of penetration and a better memory. But perhaps Christ himself gives us a clue with his "do not cling to me" (2). The Passion had taken away her Lord — this was uppermost in her mind; he whom she had loved so much was not only dead but his body had been removed so that she could not even pay it the last reverences. This thought so obsessed her that it blinded her to any idea of the Resurrection. Her state of mind was primarily emotional sorrow at losing her friend, and emotional sorrow can easily blind one to everything else. Her love for him may still have been too human, too much a love for a human individual, making it difficult for her to regard him as divine and essentially superior to death. Nevertheless our Lord paid her love the compliment of a personal appearance, second only to the visit to his blessed Mother.

Peter and John saw the undisturbed grave-clothes. Peter "went away wondering in himself at that which was come to pass"; John "saw and believed" while not as yet connecting the event with the prophecies. Peter and John are complementary characters and it is worthwhile spending some time in comparing them.

Only a few weeks before the Passion, Salome had claimed for her two sons the best places in the Messianic Kingdom. How seriously John took his mother's ideas we do not know: his filial reverence would have made him hesitate to correct her, especially in the presence of his elder brother. In any case, much can happen in a few weeks and the fact

remains that John, who rested on the breast of Christ at the Supper, was the only apostle to stand by his king on Calvary. From a comparison of his writings with those of the others we can see that he was of a more intuitive and contemplative character, and the seeds of John the theologian must have been present even in the young fisherman of Galilee. Moreover he was the beloved disciple and those whom God loves with a special predilection he endows with a special ability to love him in return: *quia amasti me, fecisti me amabilem* — not only a lovable object but a loving subject. The Divine Word, in his eternal knowledge, foresaw John's future role as the apostolic theologian and gave him a nature suitable to it, with the supernatural gifts which would raise that nature to appropriate dispositions and acts. Love and understanding are correlatives: if we must understand in order to love, we must also love in order to understand. Since his first calling by the Jordan, John's contemplative love had been absorbing our Lord's words even without his realising it: that strange faculty of the subconscious mind which not only arranges the data of memory in a suitable order but even produces the links between them — this faculty which we all possess in some measure — was especially active in John's intuitive mind. Even when he did not explicitly recall the prophecies of the Resurrection they may well have prompted his quick grasp of the situation at the tomb. Add to all this the maternal teaching of our Lady on Holy Saturday and we begin to see why John seems to have been the only disciple to realise the truth without the testimony of the angels or the Lord himself.

Where John would be content with his contemplation, Peter was never really happy unless he was doing something. When his Master was arrested he was capable of the splendid act of heroism of striking out with half the arms in the apostolic armoury, in the face of the swords and clubs of the Roman soldiers and the Temple police. But, deprived in the courtyard of the stimulus of action to make him forget his fear, he was incapable of standing the torture of helpless frustration. The memory of the triple denial and Christ's reproachful look, coupled with the dreadful events of the Passion — and his own inability to do anything about it — these had left him utterly at sea and in a state very near despair. A Judas would have committed suicide. Peter was saved from this by the very real love he bore our Lord and which prompted his contrition. But this very love would have made the memory of his denials the more bitter. The Lord had appointed him the leader of the disciples and had given him the mysterious power of the Keys. Whatever this power might mean in detail it was clearly a signal expression of our Lord's trust in him — and he had repaid this trust by cowardice and disloyalty. John, a younger man and a bit of a dreamer who had always looked up to him as a leader — and Magdalen, a mere woman — these had stood by the Master and could look back on this service as mitigating to some extent their grief. But where had the Rock been in those last hours? Where ought he to have been? Shame, sorrow, discouragement, the frustration of inactivity had made Peter a much less promising candidate for faith than John. Magdalen's report about the

body being stolen must have come as something of a welcome relief: here at last was something he could do. But this mood passed when he saw the evidence: the undisturbed condition of the grave-clothes could not be reconciled with any rifling of the tomb; why, it looked almost as though the body had evaporated from within them. And poor Peter went away, with bewilderment to add to his complex state of mind. Perhaps John also outran him on the way back, and it was then that our Lord took the opportunity to make it all plain to him and assure him of his forgiveness. Certainly by that evening Peter had managed to convey his newly-found faith in the Resurrection to some of the others in the Cenacle: "the Lord has indeed risen, and has appeared to Peter" — although they could not put much credence in the stories of the women or even, perhaps, of the visionary John, they could at least believe the hard-headed Peter. And we might also see a suggestion that some of Peter's old buoyancy and self-confidence had returned. He was again their leader.

The artistry of Luke gives us the story of the disciples on the road to Emmaus. As a piece of word-painting it is superb: one can see them, trudging down the hill road, Cleophas and his companion, sad-faced: "we *had* hoped"; resenting the ignorance of the stranger who knew nothing of the cause of their misery. They were in a much worse state than Peter: faith and hope had almost gone. From their words to our Lord it is clear that the Messiah had been for them predominantly the great Prophet and King to restore the Kingdom of Yahweh on earth. From our Lord's dealings with them they obviously needed an explanation of the whole Messianic picture to remove the obstacles of slowness of mind and hardness of heart. Gradually, their hearts began to burn within them with the love that was to resurrect their faith and hope. But they were long in recognising their teacher as the Prophet of Nazareth himself. Some characteristic gesture when he presided at their evening meal was the final link in the chain of his self-revelation, and they hurried back to the city to share their joy with the others.

Some of the brethren in the upper room were still sceptical; others capped the Emmaus story with the testimony of Peter. And while they were talking behind locked doors lest the Temple police should arrest them (on the charge of faking the Resurrection?), he was with them in the room. "But they, being troubled and affrighted, supposed they saw a ghost". In their nervous condition it did not occur to them all that he was present in his risen body. But he took pity on their weakness and gave them two conclusive proofs: the reality of his wounds and his ability to do what no ghost could do — eat a meal and show them the fish-bones left on the plate. The past few days had made them almost incapable of joy: it had all seemed too good to be true.

Thomas has gone down into history as the doubter *par excellence*. But he is distinctive not so much by the fact that he doubted — they all doubted — but by the tenaciousness of his doubt. He seems to have been both a pessimist and a sceptic. It is tempting to imagine him

refusing the shelter of the locked upper room on Easter Sunday, rather in the spirit of his "let us also go and be killed with him". If Christ was dead there was nothing else worth living for and they might as well accept the inevitable and share his fate. But underlying this would be a considerable love for our Lord, even if the love were uncomprehending and based on a very imperfect faith and hope. Christ took Thomas at his word and, a week later, offered him the chance of satisfying his own stringent demands. And Thomas leaves us one of the clearest affirmations in the Gospels of Christ's divinity: "my Lord and my God".

All our Lord's friends already possessed the gift of faith and had not lost charity nor all hope. Somewhere deep in their subconscious memory they all possessed the material necessary for a judgement of prudent credibility in the Resurrection. But their Jewish background, together with some element of self-regarding in the attitude of each, had conditioned their ability to see the evidence and prevented the good-will to believe from leading them to the conclusion. The obstacle was in the will rather than in the intellect: the Messiah *they* had hoped for was gone for ever and they had not yet learnt to want the Messiah that God had intended. So they only remembered the prophecies they wanted to remember. The rest, including our Lord's own words, they had — probably unconsciously — relegated to the mists of oblivion.

In various ways suited to the individuals our Lord led them to release from their memory all that the Prophets — including himself — had foretold. The reality of his glorified body was the last in the line of external evidence: once they had recognised that, they made their judgement of prudent credibility and were ready to respond to the divine invitation, see the obligation to believe, and make their act of faith.

One may suggest here that the analysis proposed, far from detracting from the rational aspect of faith, rather emphasises it. Respecting as he does our human nature, God waits — at least normally — for the evidence to appear prudently believable before he makes his direct and authoritative appeal. Generally he prepares the way for faith by external evidence (as in the case of the holy women, the Emmaus disciples, John and Thomas), sometimes by internal evidence, sometimes by a combination of both (as may have been the case with Peter and Magdalen, where the truth of the Resurrection was allowed to sink home gradually and may have been clinched by some internal means).

Their conversion, like all conversions, was the work of grace adapted to nature: this conversion would be completed by the Gift of Pentecost, when Peter, speaking again for them all, would voice the full Christian faith in his first sermon as the Vicar of the risen Lord.

References:

- (1) Jn 2.4; 13.1. Cf Zeitschrift (1923) 391-429; (1931) 351-402; René Laurentin, "Queen of Heaven", (Burns Oates 1956), 30f.
- (2) Cf Knabenbauer, Comm in Ev sec Jn (1906), 577f; C. Comm 812e.

AWARENESS IN GRACE

PETER HACKETT, S.J.

THE reader will not expect a new revelation. The life and awareness of grace are already his and God alone can deepen them; the theologian's humbler task is to increase his intellectual understanding of God's goodness to man. Hence, though our aim is practical in that fuller sense in which, say, a knowledge of the nature of prayer is practical, our method is theoretical. We are to explain one possible way in which the life of grace may be better understood.

The psychology of grace, if psychology be not too technical a word for our present simple preoccupations, is an obscurer part of an obscure treatise. The difficulty lies not in lack of material (there are mystical records both Eastern and Western, the accounts of conversions, studies in the psychology of vocation, etc., whose very profusion and diversity is itself a problem), but in finding a sure approach. In the first place, hard dogma offers little certain guidance beyond the assurance that a Protestant conviction with regard to our state of grace is unnecessary and Catholic teaching adds that an absolute certainty is, without special revelation, impossible. A certain indefiniteness is, therefore, part and parcel of the reality under investigation. Next, the two major schools, often labelled Thomist and Suarezian, take up contrary opinions with regard to the nature of the supernatural act and, since either could be correct *a priori*, the very possibility of a psychology of grace is put in doubt. Further and at the severely empirical level, no man would take upon himself the absolute, as opposed to the juridical judgment of another's state of grace. We may seem to have reached an impasse in which uncertainty is the only certainty, an uncertainty which concerns now acts, now emotions, now the thought and the will. Yet it should be possible to make some statement about the experience of grace that has meaning for the spiritual life of the ordinary Christian. The difficulty can be only methodological; *solvatur ambulando*.

A Theological Basis

A first necessity is to resolve or ignore the theological dispute referred to above which can be stated thus: are the ordinary Christian's supernatural actions intrinsically elevated in such sort that his whole life is renewed from within (the Thomist position, roughly stated) or, as it might seem, extrinsically elevated with the result that his life, remaining as it was before, takes on a new significance from without (the Molinist position, roughly stated)? Is the just man's kindness supernatural at its very root and known as such or is it a natural virtue, and known as such, which God then makes his own? We have said "resolve or ignore". The ambiguity is intentional for *either-or* problems are rarely solved, at least to the satisfaction of the disputants, and either side is likely to claim something of his own in the solution. We will therefore state our own preconceptions. We suggest a possible approach to the problem arising out of the concept of the *supernatural existential*, devised and propounded by Fr. K. Rahner. The problem may perhaps

be met rather from the existential than from the essential point of view and, as at the centre, so at the surface we neither deny the complete *apartheid* of nature and the supernatural when analysed essentially (which makes the Molinist position more attractive logically and leads to a suspicion of a desire of having the best of both worlds on the part of the Thomist), or their living fusion when analysed existentially in this present order of grace. Man's nature is in fact different because of grace. Hence, the psychology of historical nature will not be a science wholly different from the psychology of grace, but the foundation of it precisely inasmuch as it is true that all men are called to the life of grace.

Is this way of proceeding to beg the question? No, for the solution is adopted out of a certain pious pragmatism (I will not say enthusiasm). For, if the theological dispute is *a priori* in the sense that it presents us with two possible blueprints according to which God may have arranged the world, it tells us little about what he did in fact; whereas we pretend to analyse the fact alone. We find our proof in results, in the coherence with which we can explain the data of revelation, in religious sense as much as in rational consistency.

This approach, made so far in the abstract, may appear more real and concrete if we give it some content by an exposition of a possible amplification of the phrase *gratia inchoatio gloriae*. That grace St. Paul describes (Rom 6, 4) as a death to the world and to the flesh, a rising in Christ through Baptism and this idea the Church has made her own in the Easter liturgy. Now this is the precise pattern both of the ascent to mystical experience and to the future life of glory. St. John of the Cross, for instance, speaks of two kinds of spiritual life, one beatific, the other which is the possession of God through the union of love, and this is attained through the complete mortification of all vices and desires (and of the soul's entire nature) (1).

These matters are commonplaces, but they illustrate why, in talking of the awareness of grace, we need not bother overmuch with man's natural capacity to know the exact nature of this awareness or with the exact quality of mystical experience. Before death, in death or after death, in mortification, in the dark night of the soul or in purgatory, in some way the Christian will fill up in his own life the pattern of Christ's death and resurrection to which he has been configured already in baptism and for which his nature yearned. We are seeking his awareness of the fact that "I live, now not I but Christ liveth in me (Gal 2, 20)".

Awareness in Love

Man then is open to the awareness of grace. What sort of awareness is he to expect? The answer must lie in the reality under consideration. If, *per absurdum*, grace be conceived as a lump of spiritual substance attached from above to the higher part of the soul, it might possibly become the object of knowledge — perhaps certain knowledge. But grace, although it is a reality, is not a material thing. It should not be presupposed that knowledge of it must be direct as the knowledge a man has of a walking stick or, for that matter, of any one of the other aids to salvation. Grace, in our view, is best explained in its wholeness,

as the adoption of a man in the Son, by the Father, through the Spirit, an indwelling, a relation in Charity; the last suggests a reality in terms of which we might learn to seek awareness.

Now love is not merely something which a person does to another or to himself or both or neither, but it can enter into the definition of God and the definition of grace. (The objection that grace is really distinct from charity is perhaps sufficiently answered by noting that this distinction belongs to a different philosophico-theological order in which the terms have precise meanings which neither express nor are meant to express their whole biblical, spiritual or, in fact, real content.) We can express this truth in various ways: by saying that kindness is not so much natural as supernatural; by translating the philosopher's *ens a se* and *ens ab alio* into *amor a se* and *amor ab alio*; by borrowing St. Augustine's forcible phrase, *quia amasti me, fecisti me amabilem* and, he might have added *amantem*. It is not so much as if the breath of life created and conserved a principle of distinction, as that it creates and conserves something for the breath of love to warm into union. The love of God so enters the being of man that it is the sense of his existence, and its destruction is the destruction of the person. The poet's hyperbole of human love, "and when I love thee not, chaos is come again", is a pale reflection of the supernatural reality.

What sort of awareness is to be expected in this love of grace? To determine the nature of this awareness, we must look to the activity which proceeds from this form of love. To love, humanly speaking, is to move towards union with a principle of action produced by another, a willed search for union in the acceptance of the growing seed of love within. A man loves in doing. Nor is the supernatural analogy difficult. God's love produces in man the very principle of his new activity. This new loving life is expressed by scripture in such phrases as "doing the truth in love (Eph 4, 15)" and "if you love me, keep my commandments (Jn 14, 15)". It is not so much that we exercise spiritual muscle for the love of God, divine jesters for his pleasure, as that he implants the very principle of jesting within us which shows forth in our goodness.

It follows that awareness of love is not the same as awareness of things, but more like the awareness of self — now of a self other-selfed. A man does not merely deduce his goodness as he does that of another (*ex fructibus vestris cognoscetis vosmetipsos!*), but realises it in all his activities in grace. An example may help. G. K. Chesterton, in a characteristic dialogue in his *Secret of Father Brown*, credits the cleric with the startling statement that, if he were a good detective, it was because he had committed all the murders himself. It is not with this dramatic realisation that we are here concerned, nor with an attempt to imagine ourselves in love with God, but with the sheer bald fact of our actual knowledge that our every action in grace would be impossible without it.

Content of Awareness

Why, then, uncertainty? The reasons we give will have to be based on the discussion of the idea of *certitudo fidei* at the Council of Trent.

Now this expression was at that time patent of two very different interpretations: for the Thomist it meant the certitude that we have in the assent to revealed truth (e.g. the certainty with which we believe that God is a Trinity); for the Scotist, the certitude which we have psychologically from the known efficacy of the means of salvation (e.g. the certainty that a man has that his sins are forgiven after confession). The two possible interpretations led to much discussion at the sessions and the final statement of the Council (2) deliberately reproduces them in these words:

Nam sicut nemo pius de Dei misericordia, de Christi merito deque sacramentorum virtute et efficacia dubitare debet; sic quilibet, dum seipsum suamque propriam infirmitatem respicit, de sua gratia formidare et timere potest, cum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecuturum.

It seems, therefore, that in explaining uncertainty we had best use a distinction between grace offered and grace accepted, a distinction not to be confounded with the now rarely used Thomist distinction between grace proffered and conferred.

What, in the context of the life of charity is grace accepted? It is the Christian sense of a man's fundamental option in life, his realised attitude to God, the set of his will in grace of which his acts are the external manifestation. It is a reality which explains why the habitual sinner may, in our view, be judged not only according to the number or frequency of his sins, but also primarily according to the depth of his refusal to accept the love of God and his resolve to retain that deep-down selfishness that is concupiscence; why the good man, whose life responds to the love of God, can still commit sins which are more the indications of past misfortune than of the evil dispositions of the present. Grace accepted is manifested in the ability to will good, an ability which can achieve an ever-increasing fixity. Hence, the theologians teach that a man's certainty as to his state of grace can be greater or less according to his holiness, though it must ever remain short of absolute as the mystics themselves seem to realise. It would seem to follow that, in positing uncertainty, we are not so much denying awareness as defining one of its characteristics.

Why never absolute certainty without special revelation? The reason lies partly in the possibility of change in this life, but most of all in the second characteristic of awareness, which is obscurity. This would seem to be a necessary consequence of the normal manner both of God's offering and our acceptance of grace. For, if God's call is a personal call, it is made through the Church in faith and the sacraments in grace; the reality is hidden in the symbol. So too, in his more particular graces, God works through the ordinary ways of nature. Hence the necessity for rules of discernment of spirits; hence, too, Fr. Ernst can show how the call to religious life is more normally accepted in that serious decision of adolescence so markedly different from the vague yearnings and imaginings of childhood (3).

To say that awareness is uncertain or obscure is not to say that it does not exist, nor that it cannot be deepened. There is between the attainment of the symbol only and the attainment of the reality a range

of possibility leading to that deep penetration of the mystery of grace that Ruysbroeck describes:

But when we transcend ourselves and become, in our ascent towards God, so simple that the naked Love in the height can lay hold of us, where love enfolds love, above every exercise of virtue — that is in our Origin, of which we were spiritually born — then we cease and we and all our selfhood die in God. And in this death we become hidden sons of God, and find a new life within us; and that is eternal life. And of these sons, St. Paul says: you are dead and your life is hidden with Christ in God (4).

We have reached that stage in our argument where we could begin to build the real psychology of grace by seeking phenomenologies and pointing the pattern of all the variety of experience in charity, but that is beyond the set task. Instead and in conclusion we offer one practical application by showing the meaning that awareness gives to prayer. He who holds no awareness, holds that "Our Father, thy kingdom come, thy will be done" is a pious wish divorced from the reality he is praying; but he who holds awareness, holds that these words are also, what they surely are, a statement of fact and fact made real in the will of the person praying. He says "Our Father" and glimpses more of the mystery of adoption, he says "thy kingdom is at hand" and it is a truth he accepts in the saying of it, he says "thy will be done" for it is being done. The love that man offers to God is God's and real, not that of a man married by proxy (5).

References:

- (1) Works, ed. Allison Peers. B.O.W. 1953. Vol. 3, p. 49.
- (2) DB 802.
- (3) Option Vitale. N.R.T. 69 (1947) 731.
- (4) The Sparkling Stone in John of Ruysbroeck, Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage, etc., translated by C. A. Wynschenk Don, Dent, 1916. p. 202.
- (5) Cf. Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace, by P. Fransen, S.J., Lumen Vitae (English edition) 12 (1957) 203.

FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION IN THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

GÖRGY VASS, S.J.

THEOLOGICAL clarity is often achieved at the expense of content.

Thus in the more technical modern discussions on faith, that fuller meaning which it had, say, for St. Paul is often blurred. For him, faith plays a pre-eminent part in the Christian life (1). Faith is not only the great mystery believed in this world (cf. 1 Tim 3, 16) and expressed in belief in Christ (*pistis Iesou Christou*: Rom 3, 22, Phil 3, 9); but is too the dynamic force of our justification in Christ. It is a faith based on Christ (*ep' autoi*: 1 Tim 1, 16), a faith towards union with Christ (*pistis eis Christon*: Gal 2, 16; Rom 10, 14, etc.) (2). If then faith be considered as a commitment of the whole person, according to the teaching of St. Paul, it cannot be a mere necessary condition for justification; it must be a *strict cause* of our justification inasmuch as God justifies us *through* it (3).

On the other hand, many theologians, in their treatment of the decrees of the Council of Trent, fail to find this causality. There is

nothing explicit in the 5th session on the role of faith in the forgiveness of original sin. The 6th session, dealing directly with justification, attributes no explicit causality to faith. We are taught no more than that faith is at least a necessary condition in the preparation for justification, the real cause being baptism. Faith is mentioned only *in obliquo* (baptism which is the sacrament of *faith*), and is explained by a negative clause, which says *fides . . . sine qua nulli umquam contigit justificatio*. At the same time the Council affirms faith as a gratuitous gift informed by charity given in justification (Dz. 800). Chapter 8 alone hints at the possibility of a causal interpretation by explaining St. Paul's justifying faith as the foundation and root of all justice.

Can the fuller doctrine of Paul be found in the Council of Trent? We try to show that it can in three stages: 1. The content of the general trend of the discussions on the subject of faith was denied in neither the 5th or 6th session, but rather suggested by them; 2, to avoid a merely vague conclusion we shall survey in brief some suggestions of the conciliar fathers who defended a strict causality during the formulation of the decrees; hence 3. we shall be able to indicate a positive answer to our problem.

The Discussions of the Fathers

The matter of the causality of faith first arose in the 5th session on the doctrine of original sin. How are we freed from original sin? The fathers were in complete agreement about the primary means, the Passion and Death of our Lord, but not about the secondary means. Most preferred the explicit mention of baptism alone, though they did not exclude faith. Others, influenced by St. Paul's doctrine, stressed the importance of faith; they affirmed both baptism and faith as working principles in the deliverance from original guilt. At first this minority view seemed victorious for, in the draft of June 7th 1546, faith was mentioned together with baptism as a secondary means of justification (4). However, two principal considerations led to the alteration of the formula: a. how can faith be a true secondary means in the justification of an infant who is without it, and b. how can Protestant misinterpretations, arising out of the doctrine of *sola fides*, be avoided (CT V. 208, 32ff)? No general agreement was reached in the subsequent discussions and as time was short the present formula, where faith is not mentioned, was adopted (CT V.218, 30ff). The form was agreed to by the fiercest defenders of faith as a true secondary means, because their opinion was not as it seems excluded. The final resolution of the problem was, probably, postponed to the 6th session.

This 6th session by its so-called *tertia forma decreti* of Nov. 5th 1546, which did not even mention faith, was involved in further discussion. Those who wanted to emphasise the importance of faith criticised it strongly, and their objections led to an alteration of the draft of 11th Dec., to which a new clause was added. Baptism, first named as the only instrumental cause of justification, was now described as the sacrament of faith, and hence came our present reading *instrumentalis item sacramentum baptismi, quod est sacramentum fidei sine qua nulli umquam contigit justificatio* (CT V.700, 24ff). The intention of the

fathers in adding this clause is made clear by the explanation of Cornelius Musso, Bishop of Bitonto, one of the drafters, . . . *quod est sacramentum fidei, ut ostenderetur fidem esse causam justificationis* (CT V. 701, 21). This did not wholly satisfy the opposition, who wanted a clear statement of the kind of causality exercised by faith. Some wanted an instrumental causality, some a formal causality, though the greater part accepted the formulation of the 11th Dec. believing that faith was only a necessary condition, or at best a material dispositive cause.

The question, still unsolved came up again in the discussion on the meaning of St. Paul's principle of justification *sola fide*. But the conclusion that faith was *humanae salutis initium* did not solve the original problem, because no special causality was attributed to faith, but it was said to be the foundation and root of justification (Dz. 801). The possibility of more than one interpretation remained though some causality, unprecised, is suggested.

These indeterminate formulations have to be interpreted according to the mind of the Council. The rejection of the Protestant doctrine of a special fiducial faith is clear and definite (5), but beyond this, considering the formula *sine qua nulli umquam contigit justificatio* in the light of Musso's interpretation given above, we must seek a true causality (6). Its exact nature was not positively stated simply because the Council wished to avoid deciding matters of dispute among Catholics.

Divergent Views

Seripando is perhaps the best yardstick with which to relate the various opinions concerning the strict causality of faith. Although his theological system is apparently opposed to the letter of the decree, his influence in its final formulation is beyond doubt (7). Other views will become clearer in the context of Seripando's doctrine. The November draft of the decree (CT V. 634, 14ff), which is more or less the same as the present one, provoked Seripando's vehement opposition not only in the matter of double justice but also in that of faith. The draft of October 31st (CT V. 636, 25ff) had called faith the origin of justice and now the reshaped version said that faith was the first disposition (CT V. 512, 9ff). Seripando's marginal gloss (8) shows the violence of his reaction (for him a first disposition meant a condition only); the change seemed to him to be in contradiction with the teaching of the Scriptures and of St. Augustine, Peter Lombard, and St. Thomas.

Seripando's teaching may best be approached by some examination of his pre-conciliar sermons and treatises. As General of his Order he had faced early in his career a budding protestant influence both within the Augustinian monasteries and in theological circles in Italy. He preferred positive teaching to controversy and a religious approach to dry erudition. This attitude may explain his emphasis on God's loving mercy rather than on the consideration of merits according to God's promises. For him Man's endeavour must be, even in the state of justice, forever insufficient unless completed by great confidence in the infinite mercy of God. This mercy is revealed in Christ and we become just through union with him. Hence the frailty of human will and the necessity of clinging to the mercy of God in Christ become two basic ideas in terms of which

justification must be conceived. This frailty is the root of his teaching in the Council on concupiscence, which declares that it remains, in spite of a true remission of guilt in baptism, as the totality of all movements against God and as something displeasing to him (9). His insistence on mercy makes him think of the work of the Redemption as essentially dependent on the merciful application of Christ's justice to frail human justice. Hence it is easy to see by what process of reasoning he arrived at the theory of double justice and at the same conclusion as Cardinal Contarini, Pflug, and Gropper.

The part of faith in the process of justification conceived thus is not difficult to understand. Union with Christ and his justice is needed for liberation from the lasting effects of original sin which are manifested in concupiscence, and this liberation cannot be achieved except *through* faith in which we receive our first justification. In a treatise written to Lattanzio Tolomei in 1543 Seripando even says that this "first justice" (i.e. *ipsum fieri*) is effected through faith and *without* works (CT XII. 831 and especially 847ff). The idea recurs in his statements at the Council (CT V. 620, 19-25 and many other places), more especially in his votum during the discussion concerning the deliverance from original sin, where he suggests that the "first remedy for original sin is faith since baptism only cleanses through faith" (CT V. 194, 46; cf. 195, 31 and 751, 12ff). The formula, as we have seen, could not be accepted both because of danger of misunderstanding by Protestants and because it was considered to be of doubtful orthodoxy.

Expressed thus baldly, this doctrine does not well represent Seripando's teaching; he never lost sight, in his pre-conciliar teaching or in the Council, of the complexity of the act of faith. Faith for him is no mere first intellectual assent to God, but an act of the whole man essentially confirmed by hope and imbued with charity (CT XII. 830ff). Hence faith is involved not only in the deliverance from original sin but also in the full development of the Christian life. It is the medium through which the infinite justice of Christ achieved in final justification is conferred. In the treatise to L. Tolomei he explains this development in justice by no less than five stages. The first justification, that of faith alone as opposed to works before justification, is the beginning of a life-long sanctification leading to the cleansing of man from the last stain of concupiscence. Thus faith remains as a dynamic aspect throughout the whole Christian life and can be called the instrument of God's salvific will inasmuch as under the influence of the Holy Ghost it directs and measures the whole of Christian justice and in the end imparts Christ's perfect justice to us (Dz. 799). At the same time faith is the only means by which man can work towards his perfection through an unconditional surrender to God in hope and charity and through the good works arising therefrom. This causal conception of faith permeates his dissertations to the Council (e.g. CT XII. 830, 18ff). It runs through the first two drafts of the decree on justification, which were composed entirely by him: "the most pure justice of our Redeemer, the Saviour and Head of our race, is applied and communicated to each member through faith and the sacraments" (cf. CT V. 825, 5ff; 829, 40ff, etc.). It

leads him during the actual discussions on the causality of faith, to object to the openness of the phrase *quod est sacramentum fidei*, inasmuch as it can be understood of faith both before and after justification (CT V. 704, 1). His reasons become clear in his positive suggestions during the congregation of December 28th when he objects to the distribution of the work of justification in terms of the four Aristotelian causes on the grounds that they have no scriptural reference. But even if this distribution be allowed the place of faith must be made evident, in accordance with the view of St. Thomas "the principal cause of justification is God, the meritorious is the passion of Christ and the instrumental the sacrament. Faith is that which connects the principal cause with the instrumental, for without it God does not give grace in the sacraments and does not justify (CT V. 743, 9-12) (10)". For this reason Seripando would have preferred it among the formal causes if only the danger of misinterpretation might be avoided (CT V. 741, 35ff). However the faith of which he is speaking is *fides formata* (CT V. 743, 21-25; cf. his very clear statement on the subject CT V. 725, 43ff).

Hence in the context of Seripando's whole doctrine is established the causal action of faith which appears to him from the sources of revelation to be a dynamic principle and no mere necessary condition or preparatory act. He would appear to attribute no more value to "uninformed" faith than to good works before justification. This he puts forward on the authority of St. Augustine (CT V. 486, 20-29) and on an argument based on the doctrine of preparation and merit in the Council itself. He says, *Si dicitur fides eatenus justificare quatenus disponit, male diceretur quod opera non justificant nam et ea disponunt ut in decreto declaratur* (CT V. 743, 25ff).

Other fathers agreed with Seripando in attributing a strict causal function to faith. Some wished to have faith as an explicit instrumental cause of justification (CT V. 740, 32ff, 34 etc.). Others were dissatisfied with simple instrumentality and proposed it as a formal cause: so Lymphus of Oporto (CT V. 702, 40) supported by many others. But no conclusion was reached, not even by Musso, who sought a compromise between instrumental and formal causality. Since he was a member of the drafting committee, his votum is not without interest; he definitely rejects the view which makes faith a disposition only, because "Faith brings about justification, and baptism can be supplied by faith but not vice-versa . . . so it must be put among the causes, and could be put among the formal causes since St. Thomas says that faith is the beginning of justification (CT V. 740, 38-41)". Nevertheless he inclines to the consideration of faith as an instrument by which we cling to God, and he would have the sacrament as God's instrument of our conversion (ibid.). This irresolution on the part of the opposition led the chairman, Cardinal Cervini, to suggest the last compromise according to which faith should be called *causa apprehensoria* i.e. *per quam accipimus pollicitationem Spiritus* (CT V. 742, 1ff; cf. Gal 3, 18). The proposal was rejected because of the fear of misunderstanding by Protestants (cf. e.g. CT V. 742, 22-23) and the decree remains as we have it now. It clearly rejects

protestant teaching but is deliberately general and leaves the position open on the precise nature of the causality of faith.

The Importance of Faith

The possibility of varying interpretations flows from the fact that faith is conceived and expressed as a *disposition* to justification. Now disposition in itself may be regarded either as a necessary condition or a strict cause of justice itself. In the first case it is a psychological preparation for the supernatural virtue infused in justification and this was the sense of Chapter 5 of the Decree. In the second case faith is the real beginning of justice and perdures throughout the whole process of justification. But this latter explanation admits again of two possible interpretations. Faith can either be an instrument of God and of man, or is ontologically involved in justice as an integral part of sanctifying grace. The difference lies in this that in the first case as an instrument it remains external to the real cause of justification, while in the second case faith is already justice and is the basis of all development towards final glory.

That faith proposed as a real and very important instrumentality does not conflict with the latitude allowed by the discussions within the Council may be shown according to L. Kruse's article (11) in the fact that the 7th session on the sacraments teaches faith as a strict cause of justification in the case of the *votum sacramenti*. This *votum* is allowed in the 4th Chapter of session 6 as supplying for the reception of baptism, the strict instrumental cause (Dz. 796; cf. Dz. 847) and later for penance (Dz. 807; cf. Dz. 898) and Eucharist (Dz. 881). It is not difficult to show what the conciliar fathers understood by *votum* for it may be gathered from Musso's contribution quoted above (CT V.740, 38ff) as well as from the testimony of many others (CT V.725, 20; 731, note 3; XII.758, 49ff). Faith alone according to them can supply for the sacrament.

We offer a possible interpretation of Seripando's opinion, although with some qualifications. We are allowed to admit in a technical sense that first justification is of faith alone, provided we exclude any idea of fiducial faith condemned in canons 11-14 (Dz. 821-824). The faith intended in this first justification is already a strictly justifying one. But this fact does not force us to make a complete distinction between faith before and after justification,—as Seripando seems to have done. There is a connection between the two: a connection between the act elicited by the assistance of divine grace without the ontological sanctification of the person,—and the act of faith flowing from the habitual orientation of the person towards God brought about by its fundamental sanctification. Further we cannot explain the specific causality of justifying faith according to the theory of double justice. We can however adopt Seripando's conception of the dynamism of faith in the process of justification as explained above.

Hence faith before justification becomes a glimpse of the theological virtue and is used by God as an occasion of drawing us into the new life of Christ. It is a *point d'attache*, a working disposition for things to come. Faith after justification, on the other hand, is the first

step in justice and essentially a part of it. Its function is involved in and brought about by the inhabitation of the three divine Persons. In this faith we live and grow until we see not as in a glass darkly but face to face.

References:

- (1) Cf. Tobac, *Le Problème de la Justification dans St. Paul*, 1905, pp. 236, 239, 241, etc.
- (2) *ibid.* p. 233.
- (3) cf. Prat, *La Théologie de St. Paul*, I p. 205; cf. II p. 296.
- (4) *Concilii Tridentini Actorum pars altera*, ed. Eheses p. 197, 10.
References to these Acta are made in the text as CT. Roman numerals indicate the volume in the edition of the Acta by the Goerresgesellschaft, Arabic numerals indicate page and line.
- (5) This fiducial faith was declared by the Protestants to be the *only* instrument, cf. *Solida Declaratio* art. 3, Nr. 28 as quoted by L. Kruse, *Die Instrumentale Heilskraft des Glaubens*, *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1955, p. 435.
- (6) cf. Kruse, o.c. p. 431.
- (7) H. Jedin, *Papal Legate at the Council of Trent*, 1947 pp. 391-2; cf. Hefner, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Rechtfertigungsdekretes*, 1909 p. 212ff.
- (8) CT V.663 note 2: "Hui quid audio? Omnia quae de justificatione per fidem in sacris litteris continentur ad dispositionem sunt releganda? . . . Fides ab omni genere causae exclusa et in dispositionem materiae tamquam qualitas indeterminata in generatione naturali relegata est . . ."
- (9) Cf. Jedin, o.c. p. 318 and CT XII.847-8 quoting St. Augustine ML. 35 1697.
- (10) But it is to be noted that at the end of this contribution he concludes, "Sed has angustias nobis parit philosophia, dum volumus ex ejus praescripto de divinis loqui mysteriis."
- (11) Kruse, o.c. pp. 436-9.

ADOPTIVE SONSHIP

GERALD McENHILL, S.J.

"OUR Father, Who art in heaven . . .", "if ye ask the Father anything, he will give it to you in my name" (Jn 16, 23). "I have chosen you . . . that whatsoever ye ask the Father in my name, he may give it to you" (Jn 15, 16).

When we pray thus to the "Father", we are not in fact praying specifically to the First Person, but rather to the whole Trinity. Indeed we cannot, and should not, pray specifically to the Father; only by appropriation is such an address directed to Him. Fatherhood is attributed to the First Person as to its Exemplar, the source of "all Fatherhood in heaven and on earth". He, the Eternal Father, eternally begets a connatural son; and it is in that Son that we become adopted sons of God, adopted sons not of the First Person, properly speaking, but rather of the Blessed Trinity. Therefore, only by some appropriation is our relation of adopted sonship terminated in the Father. The reason is this: the principle of our adoptive sonship is not equality of nature with the Son, the Word of God; it is that habitual grace which is shared by us through the Son who possesses it to an infinite extent. "Of his fulness we have all received" (Jn 1, 16). Now that habitual grace which is in Christ unlimited and in us limited is a creature none the less, and as such is created by the whole Trinity. Its efficient cause it not just the Father, but the whole Trinity: the principle *omnia ad extra communia*

demands this. Hence our adoptive sonship, having its foundation in that created grace, is directed to the Trinity, properly speaking.

Only Christ can truly say "my Father" when speaking of the First Person, for Christ is by nature his Son; He was begotten by One, the Father. We on the other hand were created by Three, Father, Son and Spirit. There is then no room for the notion of adopted sons properly of the Father, whether on the basis of our natural life or of our supernatural life.

That was, until recently, the common opinion of theologians on the matter, and was strengthened by repeated texts of St. Thomas, of which the following is perhaps the best-known and epitomises the whole opinion:

... eius est adoptare cuius est Filium et Spiritum Sanctum habere. Sed hoc est solius personae Patris. Ergo adoptare convenit soli personae Patris.

"Sed contra: eius est adoptare nos in filios, quem nos patrem possumus nominare; unde dicitur (Rom 8,15): 'Accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum in quo clamamus: Abba, Pater'. Sed, cum Deo dicimus 'Pater noster', hoc pertinet ad totam Trinitatem, sicut et caetera nomina quae dicuntur de Deo relative ad creaturam ... Ergo adoptare convenit toti Trinitati (III. 23. 2).

It is our intention in this essay to propose another theory of adoptive sonship which will at once keep intact established theological principles and avoid the manifest difficulties of the opinion just explained. Furthermore, we believe that we can make more intimate and more comprehensible the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ, particularly in regard to the manner in which the pre-Christian "just" were united to that Body. The process of argumentation of the former opinion might be expressed in a convenient form thus: We are made adopted sons of God by sanctifying grace (which is also the principle of our union with Christ). Now this grace has for its efficient cause the Trinity, acting as one God. Therefore by sanctifying grace we are related to the Trinity as one God. This conclusion seems inevitable. But, we ask, is habitual grace the only principle of our union with Christ? We suggest that it is not, that there is another which will give us a union properly to the Son, and hence an adoptive sonship properly to the Father.

The entire humanity of Christ was created by the three Persons. But that humanity, natural and supernatural perfections alike, was actuated as to existence by the Divine Existence as proper to the Son of God, the Word. That is to say, the Blessed Trinity is the efficient cause of the essence of the sacred humanity, while the actuating principle of its existence is the divine existence as personal to the Word. And it is precisely because of this existential principle that the sacred humanity is hypostatically united to the Second Person, and so is specifically related to Him alone. For there is no connatural, created, intermediary act of existence in his humanity — only the uncreated existence of the Word. Now, since the Son is the divine existence as begotten by the Father, and since it is that same existence, as personal to the Word, which provides the single act of existence in the humanity, we say that Christ is thereby properly related to the Father in natural sonship; he is the Son of God. Thus we preserve the axiom: *omnia ad extra communia*; for we do attribute all efficient causality, regarding the human-

ity, to the Blessed Trinity. But this causality is in the order of essence. In the order of existence, i.e., the actuation of the existence of the humanity, we attribute causality specifically to the Second Person.

The Christian's Sonship

If we are to enjoy a truly ontological union specifically with the Son, by incorporation with the Mystical Body, then there must be some ontological principle proper to the Son, whereby such a union may be effected. We suggest that there is a common act of existence for the Christian and Christ; that over and above the Christian's personal created actuation to natural existence, he is actuated to another, corporate, supernatural existence, by the Second Person's uncreated act of existence. In the order of essence our supernatural life has indeed the Trinity as its efficient cause. But in the order of existence we — our sanctifying grace — are actuated by the uncreated act of existence proper to the Word. There is no hypostatic union consequent upon such an actuation of the Christian. For while in Christ the sacred humanity, both natural and supernatural perfections, does not exist apart from the sole uncreated divine existence as proper to the Word, the Christian's entire constitution has its natural, created and individual existential actuation, and over and above this has its supernatural existence, actuated by the Word's act of existence. The function of the natural existence is to provide the *natural* individuality of each Christian; while the supernatural existence unites the Christian ontologically with the Son incarnate and with each Christian who is actuated by that existence.

We then share in that which belongs to the Son strictly and properly, and not by mere appropriation. We have a truly ontological foundation for adoptive sonship in the Son; because we have that existence actuating to existence our entire natural and supernatural perfections, which also actuates the entire sacred humanity. Christ is, without any qualification, the Son of God; because he has only one personal and divine act of existence. We are only *adopted* sons of the Father, because our entire supernatural life, in the order of essence and existence, has been gratuitously bestowed on us by God. But since in the order of existence our supernatural life is existentially actuated by the divine act of existence proper to the second Person, we are related in our sonship properly to the first Person.

Any theory concerning the nature of the union which obtains in the Mystical Body of Christ must take account of those just men and women of pre-Christian times who, by their faith in the Christ-to-come, were made members of that saving Body. It seems to us that to make it a union in the order of essence only, that is, with sanctifying grace *simpliciter considerata* as its principle, is to weaken the whole notion of the Mystical Body as being specifically Christ's. The Christian's grace is Christ's grace, not only because it has Christ as its meritorious and final cause, but also because it is actuated to existence by the uncreated and eternal existence proper to the Son of God. If, therefore, we take that existence as the principle of union of all the faithful in Christ, it is easier to see how even the just living before Christ were real members

of the Mystical Body. Despite the fact that the Son was not yet incarnate those souls possessed "Christian" grace, and not only by reason of a supernatural perfection in the order of essence and bestowed on account of the future merits of Christ. Their grace would be "Christian" for this reason too, that it would be existentially actuated by the uncreated act of existence proper to the eternal Son, incarnate to be. Instead of limiting the principle of our supernatural life purely to the order of essence, considering it as a mere accidental form bestowed on the natural constitution of the Christian, we prefer to extend the principle to the order of existence, that the "new life" may be more incorporative in the Incarnate Son. And instead of placing the entire causality, regarding the supernatural principle, in the Trinity, we prefer to attribute to the three Persons only the efficient causality of the essence. To the second Person properly we attribute actuation of the *existence* of the supernatural principle.

The obvious difficulty is raised: how can the uncreated and infinite existence of the Word actuate existentially those created potentialities in the supernatural constitution of the Christian? Further, how can the complex of potencies in the Christian which are already actuated to existence by a natural created existence be once more actuated by another existence? We reply that, since the first actuation is on the natural plane, it is possible to have another actuation on the supernatural plane. And while the first, natural, actuation would be a created and *individual* one, the second would be uncreated and incorporative. For it seems to us that our "oneness" with Christ, so often expressed in Scripture by such allegories as the Vine and the branches, the "grafting-on" to the parent-plant, requires that there be a union in the order of existence. Now our oneness with Christ is in the supernatural order. We maintain therefore that an actuation to existence in the supernatural plane, and one which is common to Christ and to Christian, is required if there is to be an ontological unity between them. For we find it difficult to see how there can be an ontological unity where there are two really distinct existences, and no common existence, on the same plane.

With such an additional actuation to existence on the supernatural plane, by the Word's act of existence, the Christian would have a specific and ontological relation to the second Person, the Son. And with that ontological union properly with the Son, he would be specifically related to the first Person by adoptive sonship *in* the Son. A closer bond will be provided for uniting the "sons of God" in the Son and to the Son, for it is one and the same actuation to existence which is in the Son and in those who "have life" from the Son. On this basis, fresh and deeper meaning is introduced into the Christian's "Our Father" and into Christ's "I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God" (Jn 20, 17). Or rather our suggestion is more in accord with the general belief and understanding of the theologically untutored Christian using the "Our Father"; namely, that he is addressing the *first* Person as a child its father, and that the Son of God has told him so.

(This article owes much to H. P. C. Lyons, S.J., *The Grace of Sonship*, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 27 (1951) 438.)

NOTES, SUMMARIES AND REVIEWS

(i) GRACE AND INHABITATION

Nova Creatura, by Z. Alszeghy, S.J. *Analecta Gregoriana*, 1955. 284 pp.

THE development during the Middle Ages of the doctrine of grace is closely studied and its bearing on the general evolution of dogma briefly discussed by Fr. Alszeghy. His choice of medieval Pauline glosses as the most suitable material for his purpose was a happy one because it enabled him to tap fundamental contemporary ideas on grace at their source, unencumbered by the complications afforded by their application to particular problems. This material, however, provides peculiar difficulties of its own. Whole blocks of comments and citations wander intact "like mobile sandhills" from gloss to gloss, making it impossible to determine what is original or what is borrowed from where. The overall picture obtained is a confusing impression of partly distinct and partly identical works, in which even the distinct passages retain an ill-defined consonance suggestive of a common source but providing no positive proof of one. Nevertheless, certain outstanding features such as a typical method of exegesis, a characteristic doctrine, or substantially identical passages pointing to a common master, made it possible to group the sources into families according to prevalent types, which do not, however, exclude the possibility of intermediate types.

From these family groups, Fr. Alszeghy selected a number of representative glosses covering the whole period. He then took each of the classical Pauline texts on grace in turn and examined the glosses on them in chronological order. By thus following the fortunes of an identical text throughout his chosen period, he was able to detect the many minor changes of opinion and viewpoint which cumulatively effected a total transformation.

Fr. Alszeghy's list of authors extends from the 9th to the 15th century, the majority belonging to the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries. Perhaps the most important is Nicola di Lira (d. 1349). Some twelve hundred manuscripts of his glosses have been found in the libraries of the Christian world and from 1471 onwards more than one hundred editions of them were printed. The notable influence of Stephen Langton (d. 1228) is also of interest. In order to establish the limits of his investigation more clearly, Fr. Alszeghy also examined three patristic commentaries (those of Ambrosiaster, Augustine and Pelagius) and three commentaries of the Tridentine period (those of Seripando, Estius and à Lapide). Ambrosiaster was chosen because he represents opinion prior to the Pelagian controversy and was frequently consulted by medieval commentators, Augustine because of the capital importance of his exegesis for medieval Pauline literature, and Pelagius because the influence of his commentary long outlived his condemnation (Sedulius Scotus, an Irishman living in the Rhineland and writing in the 9th century, possessed a copy of his commentary and quoted him as an authority). The

Tridentine commentators were chosen for their knowledge of the principal medieval works, their acquaintance with the new exegetical trends of their own time, and their special interest in the problems of grace and justification ventilated at the Council of Trent.

Fr. Alszeghy points out that at the beginning of the Middle Ages the word "grace" was most commonly conceived in ethico-psychological terms. The condition of *nova creatura* was described as a complex of virtuous acts and as a new pattern of moral conduct. The Christian is a son of God in virtue of a moral resemblance to the Father; to be the temple of the Holy Ghost and to bear the seal of the Spirit is conceived almost exclusively in terms of a new intellectual and affective orientation towards God. The just are united in the Mystical Body because they share a direction towards the same end, and, actuated by the same motive force, they resemble one another more and more closely in the moral excellence of their lives. The need for grace is ascribed to man's weakness relative to certain acts beyond his strength.

Gradually, however, problems arose which led the theologians to search for an ultimate explanation of the mysteries of *nova creatura*, to look beyond such purely dynamic concepts towards the static, essentialist concepts of ontological perfection, habitual and formal causality, derived from Aristotelian philosophy, and to think in terms of being rather than of becoming. Grace came to be considered as a permanent state (*gratia sanctificans*), and the condition of *nova creatura* as a new "information" of the Christian. He becomes a son of God insofar as he participates in the nature of the Father, and a temple of the Holy Ghost through the Inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity, which gives him a permanent capacity for knowing and loving God in a manner disproportionate to his natural powers. The members of the mystical Body are such insofar as they have a common animation and the need for grace is explained by the necessity for a due proportion between act and being.

The distinction between these two complementary modes of expressing the same truth seen from different points of view is not purely verbal and one can be affirmed without advertance to the other. Nevertheless, more profound analysis leads from one to the other and the denial of either requires, in logic, the rejection of both. The transition from the dynamic to the static concept of grace in the Middle Ages was not deliberate. True to their constantly reiterated determination to add nothing to patristic interpretations of Scripture, medieval exegetes conscientiously repeat the formulas but their preference for certain interpretations, their elimination of doctrines not considered wholly orthodox, and their habit of abbreviating long patristic citations, gradually and imperceptibly shifted the emphasis from the dynamic to the static concept of grace. Fr. Alszeghy observes that certain aspects of the common doctrine remain latent and obscured for centuries, then suddenly take on a new light and illuminate other sections of doctrine hitherto insufficiently explored, while other ideas, previously very influential, fade into neglect.

From his own observations and those of workers in many other fields, Fr. Alszeghy opines that the static and dynamic points of view represent two typical patterns of thought (*Denkformen*). He notes that the psychology of infancy suggests that a similar transition from static to dynamic concepts occurs in the development of patterns of thought in the individual. Clearly, however, the particular categories in which an assertion is conceived or expressed say nothing in themselves of its truth or value. Hence diverse modes of conceiving and expressing the same truth may coexist perfectly well within the ambit of Christian thought and serve to enrich our understanding of it without endangering its preservation and continuity. In the view of the author, the investigation of the laws whereby different mentalities conceive and express the one truth in diverse ways is perhaps one of the most fruitful aspects of the problem of the evolution of dogma.

In discussing the application of the contrast between the dynamic and static point of view to the problem of Augustinianism and Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages, the author remarks on the marked dynamism of Augustinianism. He deplores, however, any attempts to reduce the difference between two such rich trends of Christian thought to a single element, because they result from a complicated concatenation of material, affective and intellectual causes.

In his concluding paragraph, Fr. Alszeghy points out that the notable progress in theological anthropology achieved in the 13th century was due to a successful attempt to express traditional doctrines in the intellectual idiom of the day, and in this he sees a justification for the tendency to repeat the experiment so noticeable among modern theologians. *Nova Creatura* makes both delightful and rewarding reading. Wide erudition and meticulous scholarship are all too seldom wedded to so lively a style and to such sensitive and flexible handling of most difficult material.

Philip Loretz, S.J.

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The Indwelling of the Trinity, by F. L. Cunningham, O.P. Priory Press, Dubuque, 1955. 414 pp.

THE preface of this book opens with the words *Caveat lector* and this review will endorse that sentiment. A profound analysis is set before us of the teaching of St. Thomas in the chief passages of his *Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi* (1, d.14,15) and of the *Summa Theologica* (1,43) which deal with the Indwelling of the Trinity. The opening chapters give the scriptural, patristic and scholastic background and then the work of his contemporaries is studied. The author next puts before us St. Thomas' solution to the problem. The Father, Son and Holy Ghost are present in Inhabitation as Persons distinct by reason of their proper relations, a mystery which can be explained only from the point of view of "term", insofar as the Persons are the "term" of the operations of the just. They are present as objects or fruits to be enjoyed, and can only be attained by sanctifying grace, for only in love is union with them realised. They are present really and

substantially and only such acts of grace as unite man with the divine objects can explain this, the experiential knowledge of love. It is in the truly divine habits of the gifts of Love and Wisdom that the Trinity comes to us and dwells in us. In other words, the faithful who have sanctifying grace have a certain type of "experimental" perception of each of the divine Persons. This is caused by God as one, but the objects known are the three divine Persons as they are Persons, i.e. in one nature.

The second half of the book reconciles the two chief passages on Inhabitation in St. Thomas (and this part alone would justify its publication) and examines their connection with the teaching of the major scholastics who were his contemporaries or immediate predecessors. Fr. Cunningham concludes that the teaching of St. Thomas in the *Scriptum* did not differ from that of the *Summa*, in fact the solution of the problem given in the *Scriptum* is an invaluable commentary on the solution presented in the *Summa*, and that St. Thomas' solution cannot be used to support any theories which explain the Triune presence from the formal point of view of God as principle or operating cause. St. Thomas in this matter seems to have followed the Franciscan tradition, found in the Alexandrine *Summa*, while rejecting completely the theory of St. Albert the Great.

The book has much to recommend it. The subject matter is of interest especially since today the propounders of the various theories on the Indwelling of the Trinity seek to claim the support of St. Thomas or at least to avoid going directly against him. The book is very scholarly and omits nothing of the necessary background up to the time of St. Thomas. Indeed, it strikes one as a masterpiece of clear thought and method, especially in the summaries which the author adds at the end of each chapter showing the reader what has been proved and what is to be proved next, in the excellent tables in which he compares the two sections from the *Summa* and the *Scriptum super Sententiis* with the works of St. Bonaventure, St. Albert and the Alexandrine *Summa*, and finally in the full index and exhaustive bibliography (to 1954) of both books and articles on Inhabitation. However, there are two or three unfavourable points which it would be unfair to omit in any review of a book of this kind. In the first place the language is too technical for the ordinary reader and at times, unfortunately, incomprehensible, e.g. "principated", "tentations", and "appropriable". It is true that the author defends himself in the Preface by saying "the language used is unashamedly technical, in many cases a literal rendition of classical scholastic terminology", but nevertheless he should explain these terms since he intends this book for a wider public than that of professional theologians. Secondly, the author in his zeal for St. Thomas shows signs of intolerance in dismissing many excellent theologians in a footnote or a sentence such as "on this point, many modern theologians have impaled themselves in hopeless confusion." Finally, there are signs of what is perhaps best expressed as a failure to appreciate the deepening of knowledge which the Holy Spirit grants to the Church through the

ages, but which may be less kindly described as a narrow-mindedness which lives in the past. His last sentence sums up this attitude only too well, "... St. Thomas subsumes in himself the loving labor of centuries and in and by it brings man's stutterings to their perfect conclusion. Beyond this we can say nothing essential, until such time as there shall no more be need of words".

Denis Mangan, S.J.

A NOTE ON INHABITATION

FEW objects of present-day speculative theology have more appeal than the mystery of the inhabitation of the Trinity in the souls of the just. During the last ten years theologians have written many articles on the subject, following the lead which Pope Pius XII gave in *Mystici Corporis Christi*. In these, they distinguish two questions: first, what is the special quality of the divine presence by inhabitation; and secondly, whether that presence is proper to one or more of the three divine Persons or common to Them all.

Theologians have answered the first question in different ways. One group considers God as efficient cause of sanctifying grace, and this efficient causality explains the nature of His presence by inhabitation. Another group explains inhabitation by exemplary causality, that is, through a divine operation that formally assimilates the just soul to God. A third group, not finding either of these explanations satisfactory, goes further and considers quasi-formal causality as the explanation of the divine indwelling. This view was already clearly expounded in the last century by Scheeben and de Regnon, and it has been fully developed in recent times by K. Rahner and de la Taille under the well-known theory of "created actuation by the uncreated act". This is the theory commonly held nowadays, but by no means the only one. Against this theory the Thomists object that, on Thomist principles, an actuation of the soul's essence which is not a hypostatic union is unintelligible; St. Thomas knows only two ways of immediate union with God: *secundum esse* in the hypostatic union and *secundum operari* in objective presence by way of knowledge and love.

The second question, whether this presence is proper to one or common to all of the three divine Persons, has brought about the two theories of "appropriation" and "non-appropriation". Fr. Bourassa has described them thus:

Appropriation is the attribution to one divine Person of an essential property or quality, of a common operation or relation to creatures. The reason for the attribution is some special suitability — in general, the similitude between the common operation and the hypostatic property of the Person.

Attribution by propriety (referred to in this article as the "non-appropriation" theory) means, in regard to the Persons of the Trinity, that the attribute predicated of the Person is His very hypostatic property.

There is, however, wide dissatisfaction with the appropriation theory as an explanation of our union with the three divine Persons. Thus, H. O. Dondaine O.P. recognises that "the justification and objec-

tive import of the theory is generally maintained but not fully explained". However, this theory is logically defended by those who base their explanation of the divine indwelling on efficient or exemplary causality, or who limit themselves to the explicit teaching of St. Thomas and discard *a priori* the possibility of a special relation to each of the three Persons on the plea that all *ad extra* works of God are common to them all.

But the non-appropriation theory maintains that inhabitation is not merely an *opus ad extra*, but that it is in a way *ad intra* too, and in so far as it is *ad intra* it is proper and not appropriate to each of the divine Persons. It is well known that this theory is presented under the aegis of the Greek Fathers, as opposed to the Latin or Western conception. Moreover, its foundation lies in explicit statements of Scripture which do not seem to have been meant merely figuratively.

In practice, however, authors differ in explaining the theory. Fr. M. J. Donnelly S.J. has tried to present the non-appropriation theory in an acceptable manner and his articles command respect. None the less, when he draws his principle of solution from de la Taille's concept of grace as created actuation by the uncreated act, Thomists still object that such a concept does not square with Thomist principles.

To avoid this difficulty some authors have tried to find a way of combining the appropriation and non-appropriation theories. Fr. Bourassa, for example, says that "appropriation, if rightly understood, expresses the same mystery of our intimacy with the divine Persons". If this is true, Fr. De Letter is right when he says that history and theology have not said their last word about appropriation. And it is but natural that a deeper study of the appropriation theory itself should be undertaken in an attempt to disclose the reality it hides. And followers of S. Thomas do not exclude the possibility that fidelity to the Common Doctor may yet allow one to take from the Greek theory what is most attractive in it.

Benito Blanco, S.J.

The articles referred to in this note are:

- F. Bourassa S.J., Adoptive Sonship: our union with the divine Persons. *Theol. Studies* 13 (1952) 309-335.
 M. J. Donnelly S.J., The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit according to M. J. Scheeben. *Theol. Stud.* 7 (1946) 244-280.
 The Inhabitation of the Holy Spirit: a solution according to de la Taille. *Theol. Stud.* 8 (1947) 445-470.
 Grace and Union with the Trinity: a reply. *Theol. Stud.* 13 (1952) 190-204.
 De Letter S.J., Sanctifying Grace and the Divine Indwelling. *Theol. Stud.* 14 (1953) 242-272.

(ii) PROTESTANTISM

OBSERVATIONS ON SOUTH INDIA

IT is not the purpose of this note to attempt any general survey, but to draw attention to two points which events in South India and Anglican reactions have made clear. Apart from the sources noted at the end,

most of the general judgments in the first section are supported by impressions gained from personal correspondence with a presbyter of the Church of South India and his wife.

Developments in the C.S.I.

Before the appreciative remarks which follow, it is hardly necessary to underline that where expressions such as "historic episcopate", "orders", "liturgy" or "orthodoxy" are used in connection with the C.S.I., these are terms of reference and they do not mean what we mean by the same terms. Nevertheless, perhaps precisely because the beginning was so unpromising from a Catholic point of view, there are features which are very encouraging. This is not the first Catholic appreciation; Father Louis Bouyer led the way in an article (1) of characteristically impulsive warmth, which by its comparisons at the expense of Anglicanism gave much offence to some Anglo-Catholics (2). Comment from the C.S.I. (3) combined a touching wistfulness, mystified at the novel experience of receiving sensible sympathy from this quarter, with suspiciousness of *Danaos et dona ferentes*.

Episcopacy and Church government.

Enough has been said about the vagueness of the Constitution on both the necessity and the meaning of episcopacy, and probably few would follow Father Bouyer in thinking that the formulas used improve on the Anglican ones. Yet it is a striking fact that many members of the C.S.I. of Presbyterian and Free Church origin have already come to value episcopacy of the Anglican type, and that this principle is proving to be one of inner cohesiveness and of firmness towards other bodies. For example, though the C.S.I. is committed to retain communion with all its "parent churches", talks with the Lutherans in April 1956 broke down precisely because the C.S.I. would not compromise on the principle of episcopacy. Father Bouyer writes with just approval of the development in the thought of Bishop J. Lesslie Newbigin, a former Presbyterian; the same is to be seen in many former non-Anglicans. Catholics who see mainly the deficiencies of Anglican episcopal theology cannot easily appreciate what a revolutionary change it is for, say, a Congregationalist to move from his atomic, independent and democratic Church theory and discover the problems which arise as soon as "the Church" means a unity bigger than he has known. He is brought face to face with the juridical order, and begins to realise that some long-aborred features of the Roman Church were there not because it is evil but because it is a world-wide unity. Such a man coming back to England may find a local "church" here unbearably stuffy and petty, because his vision has been so much enlarged.

As regards Church government in practice, a good summary is given in the report of the delegation sent in 1956 by the American Episcopalian Church (4). Though they stayed only a month and the report was awaited with some misgivings in South India, it appears as a product of shrewd inquiry, careful summary and fair judgment, all as

far as the circumstances allowed. The report speaks of general confidence in the bishops and in the pastoral value of this form of Church order, of firm rulings on marriage and the requirements of Church membership, of disciplinary suspension, excommunication and public penance.

The rule of faith.

Most hostile comment on the Constitution has concluded that the articles on creeds and faith are too vague and non-committal to offer any hope of doctrinal cohesiveness. Yet spokesmen of the C.S.I. have insisted that in practice their Church stands by the creeds; "The liberty of interpretation which we desire to safeguard is not intended to extend to any denial of the substance of the historic faith of the Church" (5). This may not seem satisfactory to a Catholic, but for people of whom many were brought up in the atmosphere of liberal modernism it is a most impressive return towards dogmatic faith. The present position shows a widespread mood of theological re-appraisal and willingness to learn, in which former Anglicans are not diluting their faith, while former non-Anglicans are moving, some of them fast and far, in the direction of real, if truncated, credal orthodoxy.

Liturgical life.

A form of eucharistic liturgy was introduced experimentally in 1950 and formally approved in 1954, though this approval is only permissive and does not exclude any of the orders for Holy Communion at present in use. The text is a clever conflation from many sources; on Catholic essentials, especially sacrifice, it is ambiguous but perhaps more open to a Catholic interpretation than the Anglican rite of 1552. (Yet even if it is of any value to judge the verbal expressions alone, one may hesitate to go so far as Father Bouyer in expressing enthusiasm.) Nevertheless, what has been noted above about former "free church" members is true here also. Whereas former Anglicans tend to prefer their familiar Prayer Book, former non-Anglicans are strongly attracted to the new liturgy, at least for occasional solemn use, and this has brought them under an influence whose ultimate origin is without doubt the Catholic liturgical movement. The same elements are taking to keeping Lent, and are coming to value Confirmation. There is evidence of some advance towards sacramental theology or at least towards rediscovering the sacramental view of the world, which Protestantism had rejected outright. The Constitution (C.2, section 6) insists on a measure of what we should call correct matter and form, but there is still much "irregularity", reported the American visitors (6).

There is much more in the pastoral-liturgical sphere that deserves our sympathetic interest and prayers, but this must suffice.

Significance of the Anglican recognition

It will be remembered that before the recognition by Convocations, many Anglo-Catholics expressed great alarm and hinted at serious repercussions. Yet after Dr. Fisher had reassured them—"I say boldly that in all these matters the Church of England has not abated any

single part of its Catholic heritage"—there was an immediate release of tension and the Anglo-Catholics, except for a small group of extremists, appeared satisfied. The conclusions suggested are as follows:—

1. Given what Dr. Fisher means by his words, these words and the action of Convocations are in the broad stream of Anglican policy and practice in the 16th and 17th centuries, as summarised from many examples by Dr. Messenger (7) and Professor Sykes (8).

2. Expressions such as "Catholic heritage", "Apostolic succession", "valid orders" and "intention of the Church" have not more than an equivocal unity of meaning between the Anglo-Catholics on the one hand and Dr. Fisher and those he represents on the other. These include the C.S.I., which Canterbury, very properly on its principles, has recognised. The Anglo-Catholics have constantly tried to give these and like terms their Catholic meaning in the Church of England; the main stream understands them in another sense, deliberately kept from precision yet curiously consistent within broad limits, but not a Catholic or a sufficient sense. The Anglo-Catholics remain where they are by accepting the expressions in their own sense.

3. The Anglo-Catholic view of the Anglican Church has been shown to be untrue both to history and to the present.

4. The unity of meaning of "validity" with respect to Anglican orders is coming under still greater strain. The more it is maintained in the Catholic sense, the more this embarrasses those who are wooing the Presbyterians; for to any good Presbyterian or English Free Churchman, the very idea that valid or invalid orders mean anything before God is a serious reason for not joining up with people who think that they do.

5. The whole dispute about the validity of Anglican orders is subsequent to the question of the nature and authority of the Church. It would be more fruitful to keep our attention on these, since they cannot be by-passed.

Robert Murray, S.J.

References:

- (1) L'Union des églises du Sud de l'Inde, in Istina, April-June 1955. The last section, containing conclusions, was translated in Theology, January 1956.
- (2) E.g. Mr. W. Grisbrooke in Eastern Churches Quarterly, Spring 1956.
- (3) Impressions of an article in "The South India Churchman" in 1956.
- (4) Report of the Delegation sent to the Church of South India by the General Convention of the American Episcopal Church, 1956 or 1957 (no date).
- (5) Quoted by the American report, p. 44-5.
- (6) Ibid. p. 40.
- (7) The Reformation, the Mass and the Priesthood, vol. 2, esp. chapters 12 and 15.
- (8) Old Priest and new Presbyterian, Cambridge 1955.

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The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, by Louis Bouyer. Harvill Press, 1956. 18s.

FATHER BOUYER, a former Protestant minister, has made an analysis of Lutheran and Calvinist Protestantism by means of an extremely clear and simple framework. The first part is appreciative.

If, as is so often said, Protestantism is founded on the supremacy of private judgment, this cannot explain how it remains strong and often revives, and that precisely by returning to its sources. The reason, says Father Bouyer, is that both Luther and Calvin had deep and genuine insights into essential Christian doctrines which were not being stressed enough in their time, namely that salvation is by grace alone, that man can make no salutary response except the act of faith, and even this only by grace; that God's infinite majesty cannot be "humanised", and that Holy Scripture is the very Word of God in which he speaks to man. In calling these the foundations of Protestantism, Fr. Bouyer abstracts as yet from the anti-Catholic elements which were mixed with them from the first; he denies that these were essential, though perhaps they were historically inevitable. Consequently he has little difficulty in giving a very favourable picture of all that Catholics can approve in Protestantism, and in showing how the points mentioned above are altogether conformable to Catholic doctrine. Thus far the reader is carried on by a wave of excited optimism, and might be wondering where the snag is. This is not to deny that the appreciative half of the book is valuable; indeed, the more it surprises a Catholic reader, the more valuable it will be for him. All here is true, but a lot more that is true is kept for later.

In the second part the author discusses the negative elements of the Reformation, showing how each of the three great fundamentals was corrupted from within from the beginning, and in time came to a far worse betrayal of the very truth which the original protest wished to re-instate. In each case the villain is named as Nominalism, which according to Fr. Bouyer was universal, and prevented either the reformers or their first opponents from reaching the balance of Thomism. That they missed this balance is true; but the allusions to Nominalism cannot but leave the reader uneasy. Till the works of the later medieval theologians become more easily available, few historians of thought would venture to generalise as Fr. Bouyer does. Nominalism certainly was not universal in the early 16th century; in Paris, where Calvin had studied, the Thomist school flourished and was reviving.

The argument proceeds inexorably according to the framework adopted, and the very favourable beginning is balanced by a severe judgment at the end, especially on Barth, though the dominant spirit of the book is always charity. It is very pleasing that the English edition of Professor Van de Pol's "The Christian Dilemma" (Dent, 1952) has been followed so soon by this work. After the solidity and extraordinary objectivity of the former, one welcomes something written more from the heart; but the purpose of both books is better served by the phenomenological presentation of Protestantism as a whole in "The Christian Dilemma".

Robert Murray, S.J.

(iii) SCRIPTURE

Essai sur la Pensée Hébraïque, by Claude Tresmontant. *Lectio Divina* 12, Editions du Cerf, 1953. 163 pp.

Etudes de Métaphysique Biblique, by Claude Tresmontant. J. Gabalda et Cie., 1955. 261 pp.

IN the first of these two books Fr. Tresmontant's purpose is to show the characteristic traits of the Hebrew mind. To bring out the real meaning of biblical notions he examines some important notions in the very different philosophical systems of Plato and Bergson. The conflict thus set up between the different forms of the same notion helps the author to reach the true Hebrew idea. Such a study, as Fr. Tresmontant points out, is clearly strictly philosophical. The book is a collection of short essays grouped in three chapters: *Le Création et le Créé*, *Schéma de l'Anthropologie Biblique*, and *L'Intelligence*.

In the first chapter the author analyses the notions of creation, time, matter, the object of sense-perception, Israel and the Incarnation. For the Hebrew mind creation is not the disintegration of the Platonic "One", but a positive action of the almighty God, which goes on continually and which man is invited to co-operate with. From man's point of view creation is an evolution, ever-growing and self-perfecting, not a Platonic descending movement. Time is not an external measure of movement, as in Greek philosophy, but a mark of the ripening of reality as it unfolds. The man who knows time knows the future, since the future lies in present events as the flower lies in the bud. Each event takes place just when the fulness of time (*pleroma*) has come; God prepares the way for every historical event, and every event bears a meaning in its historical setting. Such a concept excludes the Platonic notion of the chaos of this world. Nor can eternity be conceived as an unending cyclic movement, but as an everlasting present.

The Hebrew mind does not accept matter as a component of reality: the matter of the Greek philosophers is needed to explain the process of making as a human craftsman makes, but creation, by contrast, is making from nothing, and does not start from matter. Nor in the Hebrew way of thought is there any opposition between what is perceived by the senses and what may be understood by the mind, for a concrete reality can, by symbolism in action, make known the deepest mystery; existent reality is rich enough to express the intelligible. Platonism assumes that to understand the intelligible world we must turn away from the sensible world, and Plato used myths to show what the intelligible world is like; the Bible, on the contrary, uses the simplest and most concrete of parables.

Israel the author shows as an alliance (*berit*) between God and the men who are ready to co-operate with God for the Incarnation. The Incarnation itself is quite unintelligible on the presuppositions of Greek philosophy, but Hebrew philosophy prepares for an understanding of it: if what is perceived by sense cannot express the truth, if matter necessarily imposes limitation, if time excludes eternity and if creation is a disintegration, then the Incarnation is impossible.

In the second chapter, the author shows that in the Bible the Platonic body-soul dualism is unknown, for the flesh (*basar, sarx*) is synonymous with the soul. The opposition between flesh and spirit (*ruah*) is not inside human nature, it lies between human nature and man's supernatural vocation. Christianity is therefore not a way of asceticism which strives after spiritual existence by destroying the body; the flesh (that is, body and soul) becomes spiritual by the inhabitation of the spirit (*ruah, pneuma*).

The third chapter discusses the meaning that Hebrew thought attaches to "intelligence". Since Hebrew is a concrete language it has no word for "understanding" as a faculty: understanding means an action, an "engagement" in the truth, one that cannot be separated from life — "give me understanding and I shall live" (Ps. 118, 144); "he who saith that he knoweth him and keepeth not his commandments is a liar and the truth is not in him" (1 Jn 2, 4). Faith is a spiritual understanding (*sunesis pneumatike*) with mysteries as its object; the mysteries in themselves are supremely intelligible and God has revealed them not because they are unintelligible, but because they cannot be known outside an I-thou relationship. Faith is thus a self-perfecting, ever-deepening understanding of God and reality: "for nothing is covered that shall not be revealed, nor hid that shall not be known" (Mt 10, 26).

The book ends with three short essays — *Le Néo-Platonisme de Bergson*, *Le Souci* and *La Pensée hébraïque et l'Eglise*.

Fr. Tresmontant's second book is a study of biblical metaphysics, based on the research of his earlier work. He first examines the relation between biblical metaphysics and reality, describing biblical metaphysics as "*la lecture positive de la réalité*". He then points to its distinguishing marks, discusses at greater length the idea of creation as an unfolding reality and the cognate ideas mentioned in the previous book, and shows how these ideas lead towards fuller theological and historical understanding. There are also three excursus: *La Notion du Miracle*, *Notes sur la permanence de la Gnose dans la Philosophie Occidentale*, and *Traduction de Gen. I-III*.

Elemér Nemesszeghy, S.J.

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La personne de Jésus et ses témoins, by L. de Grandmaison, S.J., Verbum Salutis, Beauchesne, Paris, 1957. 263 pp.

IN 1928 P. de Grandmaison's life work *Jésus Christ* appeared in two large volumes. In 1934 Sheed and Ward published an English translation by Douglas Carver. *La personne de Jésus* is a much smaller book, no bigger than a Penguin. It is not a condensation of the whole of P. de Grandmaison's original work, but a new edition of selected chapters from it.

In his Conclusion (*Jésus Christ*, II, p. 661) P. de Grandmaison expressed his twofold aim of helping Christians to understand their faith better and of shaking the assurance with which sincere unbelievers reject

Christ's message. The preface of the original edition described the work as an *oeuvre apologétique* (I, p.v), and this is clearly correct, as the subtitle *Sa personne, son message, ses preuves* shows. The author was in fact attempting to give not merely an account of the life, character, and teaching of Christ that would satisfy the most rigorous demands of scholarship, but to defend his position against the attacks of rationalists and liberal Protestant critics. For example, out of some 1,200 pages he devoted over 200 to an evaluation of the sources and about 150 to the discussion of the Resurrection.

P. Daniélou, who has edited the new edition, has contributed a valuable preface, in which he gives his own reasons for republishing this portion of the work. He admits that much of P. de Grandmaison's argument and his account of *le milieu évangélique* has been put out of date by the recent developments in New Testament studies and the new facts revealed by the Dead Sea Scrolls. But, the editor argues, advances in exegesis cannot invalidate the New Testament's account of Christ's *personne*.

All this interest in "*la personne*" with its faint echoes to modern ears of Existentialism we may be tempted to discount as very French. It is not easy to translate the concept into English. It might well seem, to some at least, a misuse of language to speak of the "character" or personality of a man in whom no one quality outgrew any other. Now P. de Grandmaison does not attempt a "character study" of Christ. He is concerned with Christ's human nature and the gradual revelation of his divinity. He next develops at length the stock argument that Jesus' life proves that in making these claims he was no imposter or deluded visionary. Finally, after a brief discussion of the theology of the Incarnation, the author shows how throughout its history, from the first century up to modern times, the Church has believed in, drawn inspiration from and worshipped the two natures of Christ.

Solid devotion must rest on firm intellectual conviction. One cannot penetrate however superficially into the mystery of the Incarnation without becoming aware of some of the difficulties. Whatever its apologetic value, this book, by its clear statement of doctrine, its honest examination of the Scriptures and its convincing replies to objections, cannot fail to help many laymen and religious to a closer knowledge of Christ. It was P. de Grandmaison's contention that, though one may dispute the interpretation of individual texts, the evidence for our knowledge of Christ is cumulative and *mole sua stat* (*Le personne de Jésus*, p. 75). The author's presentation of this evidence is as valid and as vital today as it was in 1928, and it is this part of the original work which P. Daniélou is making available once more to the public.

The text of these selected chapters the editor has left practically untouched; but there is one revealing omission. In his reprinting of the Conclusion (p. 259) he suppresses the passage in which P. de Grandmaison states his hope of shaking unbelievers. Again, although the editor has himself occasionally added references to modern works, he has omitted many controversial and exegetic footnotes. One might easily form the impression that P. Daniélou's aim has been to water down what

was intended as an apologetic work into a mere devotional treatise. This would be a misconception, for the editor in his preface (p. 13) states: *La valeur incomparable du livre que nous préférons est de montrer les assises inébranlables dans le Nouveau Testament du dogme de Chalcédoine*. But it is, I think, fair to surmise that the omission of much of the detailed scholarship of the original will make this a book primarily for Christians, though a more readable one for a wider Christian public.

Edward Yarnold, S.J.

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Concordance of the Synoptic Gospels, by Xavier Léon-Dufour, S.J., translated from the French by Robert O'Connell, S.J. Desclée and Co., 1957.

THIS little booklet (11" x 4") contains three coloured "maps" of the synoptic gospels in seven colours, and twenty pages of explanatory notes. Each evangelist is allotted a primary colour and has his own "map" which opens outwards in six panels. The map presents not only the *content* of the synoptic verses, but also their context. Thus each event and significant phrase has its own coloured band (2") and is followed by a row of coloured discs which declare whether the context is the same in each gospel. Where two or more evangelists record the same thing, their primary colours give way to a new colour according to the rules for mixing pigments.

Context and content are the chief but not the only things presented: little borders at top and bottom of the bands show the presence of doublets, and the existence of texts closely related to or identical with that portrayed by the band; further symbols show the nature of our Lord's audience, geographical indications in the text, quotations from scripture, the reaction of the crowd, a summary.

A colour-map obviously does not tell one more than a harmony, but a good one like this does declare at once, by giving one a bird's-eye view, what is the whole situation of any passage. Take a case almost at random (what must be provided from a harmony is given in brackets): the map of Mk shows at once that in 3. 7-13 the Jews are beginning to take sides against Christ and are bent on his ruin; the passage is concerned with the crowds who press round him by the lake (seeking cures), and starts with a geographical indication (towards the sea): Christ is with his disciples; the three synoptists are in agreement to begin with, but presently Mk and Lk add a detail which Mt omits (the crowds come even from Tyre and Sidon); Mk then adds a detail which the others omit (the disciples must have a boat ready because of the throng); all three synoptists then continue in agreement (he cures them); but Mt and Lk then add a detail (the crowd press upon him to touch him); next, Mk and Mt add a detail (he warns the devils not to make him known); the passage concludes with a summary (and he healed them all) and a refrain expressing the reaction of the witnesses (and the unclean spirits used to cry out, "Thou art the Son of God").

The coloured discs at the side of the band show that the parallel passages in the other synoptists are Mt 12. 15-16 and Lk 6. 17-19, and that the context of Lk's passage is different from that of Mk and Mt. A coloured border adds that most of what is common to Mk and Lk here but omitted by Mt is recorded by him in a closely related passage which a coloured disc shows to be 4. 24-25 (where he omits only that the crowd wished to touch Jesus); and another coloured disc shows that there is a related passage in Mk 6. 53-56 and Mt 14. 34-36 where the content is much the same but the context slightly different (and here at last Mt notices the desire of the crowd to touch Christ). A coloured border at the top of the band shows that there are doublets in both Mk and Mt (Mk: the desire to touch Jesus; Mt: that he cured all). Finally, a yellow border at the bottom shows that what Lk omits at the end of the passage (the devils) is provided in a related passage, 4. 41.

The size of the production bears no relation to the ingenuity with which it has been contrived, nor to the immense amount of information within. The reviewer has spent many days merely familiarizing himself with the symbols and colours; to absorb all the information would take many months. Not that Fr. Léon-Dufour claims to have produced an exhaustive document — he encourages his readers to add private notes and symbols to their maps, and he humbly invites criticism and suggestions from all.

May we then suggest that, notwithstanding the ingenious folding of the maps, it would be better to make the concordance into a wall-map about four times the size of the present ones with the related panels adjacent, and with more details typed on the bands. That would indeed be perfection.

John Berrell, S.J.

(iv) OTHER QUESTIONS

Contemplation in Action, by J. P. Conwell, S.J. Gonzaga University, Spokane, 1957. 128 pp.

SINCE it is so difficult for the English reader to get at Fr. Nadal's writings it is a matter for gratitude when a study even of a small part of his teaching appears in English. Nadal was so close to St. Ignatius, who trusted him as one of the best exponents of the Society's way of life, that it is fitting to turn to him, as Fr. Conwell has done, for an account of the prayer proper to the Society. That there is such a prayer Nadal has no doubt, though the characteristic lies deeper than any of those "methods of prayer" so minutely described by commentators inside and outside the Society.

Nadal looks for the characteristic marks of Jesuit prayer in the prayer of Ignatius himself, in the meditations of the Kingdom and the Two Standards, and in the consideration of the purpose of the Society. Fr. Conwell considers each of these in turn. In the prayer of Ignatius himself he notes particularly the high degree of infused contemplation and Ignatius' abiding awareness of the Trinity after the vision of La

Storta; he does not agree with those who think that Nadal teaches that every Jesuit has a vocation to some degree of infused prayer, but he emphasises that every Jesuit can be expected to imitate Ignatius in his pre-occupation with the Trinity. The Jesuit should, like Ignatius, see himself as placed by God the Father at the side of his Son.

The Kingdom and the Two Standards, with their emphasis on militant service with Christ, remind the Jesuit, in Nadal's words, how necessary it is for us to go to Him each day, to find out from Him the way to fight, and for Him to send us into the battle Himself.

But it is the spirit of prayer based on the purpose of the Society that is most fully explained, the spirit of contemplation in action. Here, in expounding Nadal's teaching, Fr. Conwell insists that the prayer of the Society must reflect the twin purposes of the Society as they are, in co-ordination, not rigid subordination. Prayer is thus not to be thought of as the filling of a spiritual reservoir which will be expended on work; rather, each influences and invigorates the other: work done in the service of God is based on prayer and flows back into it and strengthens it; prayer leads to work and follows from it. Neither can be given unqualified primacy as a force for uniting men to God; and each requires and thrives on and leads to mortification.

It is this final section which goes most directly to the root of the Jesuit's life of prayer, but even here the author appears to be shackled by his attempts to follow Nadal's threefold divisions of the characteristics of the Society's prayer. The quotations from Nadal (and they are many) do not suggest that he was giving a reasoned, scientific account of the Jesuit's approach to prayer; he appears to have shared St. Ignatius' genius for knowing what was the right thing to do, and also his comparative lack of interest in the reasons that lay behind it. Fr. Conwell is most honest in admitting that Nadal is often obscure, but his attempts to reconcile Nadal's diverging statements leave one unconvinced that Nadal's views were entirely coherent.

The book began life as a doctoral dissertation and suffers from its origins. The detailed textual study of Nadal, necessary in a piece of exact scholarship, could have been more sparingly presented to the general public, who are rightly more willing than an examiner could be to take the author's accuracy on trust. At the same time this wider audience would be glad of some more general information. A study of the distinguishing marks of Jesuit prayer could well say more than this book does of what it is distinguished from. The traditional *contemplata aliis tradere* is like the apostolic prayer of the Society, with its living interchange between prayer and action; but it is not the same, and the comparison made here teases by its brevity. Again, is the "prayer proper to the Society" so clearly a distinguishing mark of the Society to-day as it was in the 16th century, or is this intimate fusion of prayer and action now much more the common possession and practice of the orders and congregations of the Church than it used to be? It may be hoped that Fr. Conwell will write more about Nadal and his age, with wider terms of reference, and answer many questions which his present book prompts.

Michael Fox, S.J.

Il Beato Innocenzo XI, by Carlo Miccinelli, S.J. Vatican Press, Rome, 1956. 130 pp. and 33 plates.

WHO was Innocent XI? Thus does Fr. Miccinelli begin his modest little biography prepared on the occasion of Innocent's Solemn Beatification in Rome last October. For two centuries his beatification had been shelved because of French pressure opposing it in 1744 when all seemed ready. In the face of strong opposition and the prospect of worse, Benedict XIV declared that the beatification of this saintly Pope was a work "not of these our times". In these our own times the career of Benedetto Odescalchi makes strange reading, and one is grateful for Fr. Miccinelli's short account, compressed as it is from his two volume work published in 1943 in preparation for Innocent's beatification.

Born in 1611 of a wealthy banking family, he was educated at the College of the Jesuit Fathers in Como. He joined the Sodality there and was later a member of the Sodality attached to the Gesu in Rome. He first went to Rome to complete two years of Canon and Civil Law when only 25, his intention being to live privately as a cleric (not priest), quietly devoting his time to study and looking after his patrimony in the celibate state. At 29 he bought a Roman prelature on his brother's advice, received the first tonsure and rapidly climbed the ladder of ecclesiastical preferment. He was first appointed Commissary of the Marches, where his administrative skill soon induced Innocent X to appoint him Clerk of the Camara. He was appointed Cardinal Deacon of Saints Cosmas and Damian when not yet 34 or yet a deacon, then Cardinal of the Curia, and at 37 was made Legate of Ferrara with full legislative power. He was elected Bishop of Novara before his 39th birthday, and so had first to be ordained priest. Reappointed Cardinal of the Curia when he was 43, he lived in Rome until his election to the Papacy at the age of 65. He died in 1689 aged 78.

A magnificent administrator, in all his appointments he earned the enthusiastic acclaim of his subjects and the title of Father of the Poor. He used his own wealth to alleviate the conditions of his impoverished subjects. The account of his methods of breaking up the black market in wheat reads like a novel. His own career owed not a little to influence and the payment of place-money, yet he abhorred any form of nepotism and struck it a death-blow in his pontificate. A great defender of the rights of the Church, his struggles with Louis XIV of France remind one of the struggle between Philip and Boniface VIII, but in the face of great opposition he yielded not one inch to that monarch's gallicanism. Almost single-handed he sought to interest Europe in the war against the Turks, who were menacing Christianity at that time. His methods of financing the war make interesting reading. Tall and majestic, he creates the impression of a man dedicated to duty. A great man of great integrity and in the words of Fr. Miccinelli, the greatest Pope of the seventeenth century.

Alberto De Marco, S.J.

John Carroll of Baltimore, by Annabelle M. Melville. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1955. 338 pp

ALTHOUGH John Carroll's life as a Jesuit was cut short by the suppression of the Society shortly after his ordination, during the rest of his long life he proved himself a true son of St. Ignatius by his exemplary life and by his care for the members and property of the former Society and by his work for its restoration in North America.

As the sub-title of the biography, "Founder of the American Hierarchy" suggests, it is with Carroll's career after his return to Maryland that the writer is chiefly concerned. Indeed, the story of his early life can be briefly told. Born into a Catholic Maryland family of Irish origin which was destined to play an important part in the birth of a new state (his brother Charles was one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence), John first attended the small Jesuit preparatory school in Maryland and then crossed over to St. Omer's. On the completion of his schooling he entered the Society in Flanders, where he pursued the normal course of studies. Within a few months of his final vows in 1771, he accompanied the young son of an English nobleman, Lord Stourton, on a tour of the Continent. This two-year tour, which included a visit to Rome, was an experience which was to prove most useful to the future bishop.

In 1774, following the suppression of the Society, Fr. Carroll returned to Maryland to find the clergy there in a peculiar position. Many of them had been Jesuits under the authority of the English Provincial and supervised by a local superior, who was also the Vicar-General of the Vicar Apostolic in London. The Jesuit organisation had been swept away and contact with London severed by the Declaration of Independence. Fr. Carroll put forward a "Plan of Organisation" for the government of the clergy and for the safeguarding of the property of the former Society, which was adopted. 1784 saw John Carroll appointed Vicar Apostolic of an area which stretched from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, and from Canada to Spanish Florida. Five years later, at the same time as Washington became the first President of the United States, Carroll became North America's first bishop.

From then onwards his life was ever more closely devoted to the rapidly growing Church. Yet, despite the Bishop's ever increasing responsibilities, the former Society was not forgotten. Owing largely to John Carroll, America did not have to wait for the full restoration of the Society but saw, as early as 1805, a restored Society aggregated to the Jesuits in Russia. By 1808 North America was ready for its own hierarchy. Baltimore became a metropolitan see with four suffragan sees. However the Bishop had his crosses as well as his successes, frequently troubled as he was by threatened schisms and erring clerics. But, as Fr. Plowden was to remark, "his known piety, erudition, sweet temper and amiable manners seemed to have subdued the usual sourness of discordant sectaries". It was not surprising then that the whole city of Baltimore mourned his death in 1815.

Miss Melville's biography reads well and contains a very full bibliography and a good index, and would seem to justify her in claiming it to be a work "carefully documented, truthfully reported, and interpreted with caution and respect for the sanctity of personality".

Bernard J. Darke, S.J.

Bibliography of the English Province of the Society of Jesus 1773-1953, compiled by Edmund F. Sutcliffe, S.J. Obtainable only from the Manresa Press, Roehampton, London, S.W.15. 1957. xii, 247 pp. 63/-.

THE chronological list of Jesuit bibliographies which Fr. Sutcliffe provides, shows that his own contribution forms part of a long tradition. Peter Ribadeneira's *Illustrum scriptorum religionis Societatis*, published at Antwerp in 1602 was the first venture in this field — it is of interest that, some seventy years later, a member of the English Province, Fr. Nathanael Southwell re-edited this work at Rome. In 1953, in the same city, Fr. Iesus Juambelz S.J. produced the fourth volume of his *Index Bibliographicus Societatis Jesu*, covering the years 1940-1950. But these works dealt with, as far as possible, the whole of the Society's literary output; as that output increases, a greater approach to completeness can be attained by bibliographies confined, like Fr. Sutcliffe's, to a particular Province.

The main part of the present work is arranged in alphabetical order of authors' names; but publications dealing with colleges and parishes belonging to the English Province are also, most conveniently, listed under the names of their subjects. In addition to works written by members of the English Province are included also those published by members of other Provinces while working here. Very full information is provided about places and dates of publication, publishers' names and book formats; with the names of authors are supplied also the dates of their birth, entry into the Society and, where applicable, death. Details are given of articles which have appeared in a wide range of periodicals, both English and foreign — from *The Astrophysical Journal* to *Razón y Fe*. Even prefaces to other people's books are entered. Where works have been translated from English into a foreign language, particulars of both versions are provided.

There is a detailed subject index, the printing and lay-out are clear, the work is of convenient size. It will be of value, not only to librarians, but to all who, for whatever reason, are interested in the literary activity of the English Province during the past two hundred years.

Kenneth Spence, S.J.

